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Abstract: This article discusses the proposal of accommodating grounding 
theories and structural realism, with the aim to provide a metaphysical 
framework for structural realism (ST). Ontic structural realism (OSR), one of 
the most accepted metaphysical versions for structural realism, is taken into 
account here, with the intention of analyzing the framework in which GT and 
OSR are compatible, and to what extent. 




Worrall (1989) introduces structural realism as the best version of scientific 
realism, a positive answer to the pessimistic meta-induction able to account for 
the ‘realist’ label enforced by the ‘(no) miracles argument.’ Scientific realism is 
the view according to which we should commit ourselves to the existence of the 
non-observable entities posited by our scientific theories. Thus, the success of 
science would not appear to be a mere coincidence, but something to be 
expected, as scientific theories are at least approximately true descriptions of the 
world. Still, there is this phenomenon of theory change which casts doubt on the 
realism of our theories – in the history of science one may encounter many 
examples of theories once considered true, but then dismissed and replaced by 
other theories which had the same fate. Structural realism, then, is a 
commitment to the (mathematical) structure of our best theories, not to the 
unobservable entities they posit, and its roots can be traced back to Poincaré, as 
Worrall points out:  
 
There was an important element of continuity in the shift form Fresnel to 
Maxwell – and this was much more than a simple question of carrying over the 
successful empirical content into the new theory. At the same time, it was 
rather less than a carrying over of the full theoretical content or full theoretical 
mechanisms (even in ‘approximate form’) [...] There was continuity or 
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accumulation in the shift, but the continuity is one of form or structure, not of 
content. In fact, this claim was already made and defended by Poincaré. 
(Worrall 1989, 117) 
 
Worrall’s proposal to take into account a structuralist version of scientific 
realism, in which the main role is to be played by the relations among 
phenomena that our best (accepted) theories illustrate, would give, then, a 
glance at how, and not what, we can know. Following Ladyman (1998), in this 
paper I will call the version of structural realism that Worrall endorsed epistemic 
structural realism (ESR). Worrall points out that his proposal is no novelty: 
It cannot be said that this is reducing physical theories to simple practical 
recipes; these equations express relations, and if the equations remain true, it is 
because the relations preserve their reality. They teach us now, as they did then, 
that there is such and such a relation between this thing and that; only the 
something which we then called motion we now call electric current. But these 
are merely names of the images we substitute for the real objects which Nature 
will hide for ever form our eyes. The true relations between these real objects 
are the only reality we can attain... (Poincaré quoted in Worrall 1989, 118) 
Worrall takes into account Hardin and Rosenberg’s view according to 
which, in the case of theory change from Fresnel’s to Maxwell’s theory on the 
nature of light, the first one was actually referring to the same entity as the latter 
and also Boyd’s account on theories as better approximation to the truth. His 
argument is that although the conclusions both parties arrived at are wrong, the 
intuitions lying behind them are correct – there is continuity in the shift from 
one theory to the other, not in content, but in form or structure.2,3 The version of 
structuralism endorsed by Worrall is considered to be, mainly, an 
epistemological one, as Ladyman’s (1998) analysis points out. Referring to 
Grover Maxwell and Russell’s account, according to which only second order, 
descriptive, structural properties of objects can be known, Ladyman discusses 
the problems this form of epistemic structuralism eventually encounters:  
There are serious difficulties with this view, which were originally raised by 
Newman (1928) [...]. The basic problem is that structure is not sufficient to 
uniquely pick out any relation in the world. (Ladyman 1998, 412) 
In Ladyman’s view, Newman’s problem could be given a solution in 
accordance to Benacerraf’s observation that objects, in order to be properly 
named as such, should be treated as individuals in the structure, otherwise there 
is danger that, given the right setting, any ‘object’ could occupy the respective 
position. From this point of view, what structural realism tells us is not about the 
                                                        
2 A detailed analysis of the equations from Fresnel and Maxwell’s theories is to be found in 
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objects or their properties, but about the relations and the structure the world is 
made of (Ladyman 1998, 422). 
The structural realist demands for a metaphysical framework, able to 
account for the relation between models and the world, one in which objects can 
be individuated, thus complying with Benacerraf’s observation. The thesis of the 
present paper is motivated by this request, which I also corroborate with Psillos’ 
critique on the strongly developed ontic structural realism, presented below. 
Ontic Structural Realism 
One of the most extensively discussed solution to the demand for a metaphysical 
framework is ontic structural realism (OSR), developed initially by French and 
Ladyman (2003). A detailed exposure is to be found in Ladyman and Ross (2007, 
chapter 3). I will briefly characterize it here as the commitment to the idea of the 
world having an objective modal structure, described by our best scientific 
theories and independent of our epistemic states. Ladyman and Ross advise the 
understanding of the term ‘modal’ as ‘nomological,’ in the case of fundamental 
physics,4 which is at the center of their discussion, thus saving the no-miracles 
argument for realism in science. Objects are considered to be “pragmatic devices 
used by agents to orient themselves in regions of spacetime, and to construct 
approximate representations of the world” (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 130), 
whose identity and individuality is to be defined in terms of the world’s structure. 
Moreover, as they specify,  
[...] This is the sense in which our view is eliminative; there are objects in our 
metaphysics but they have been purged of their intrinsic natures, identity and 
individuality, and they are not metaphysically fundamental. (Ladyman and Ross 
2007, 131) 
Structure becomes, thus, ontologically (more) fundamental, in comparison 
to objects which are to be identified, on the new terms, via group theoretic 
structure, following Weyl (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 145). Individuals become 
locally focused abstractions from modal structure – the relationships among 
phenomena to which modality can be ascribed to (necessity, possibility, 
potentiality and probability). 
Modal commitment thus proves to be one of the most important features 
of scientific realism; in the case of ontic structural realism, natural necessity 
must be taken into consideration. Psillos criticizes this account, in which 
modality generates structure, all being reflected in the retainment of the 
mathematical structure of our best accepted theories, and notes that 
mathematical structure is abstract, and abstractions do not have causal powers. 
Should structural realism be abstract enough to enable discussion of structure, 
and also concrete enough to be instantiated by physical systems, as French 
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requires, Psillos asks the question of priority – to whom are structures prior to, if 
they are all that there is? The positive side of Psillos’s critique is built on the 
assessment of a version of OSR, M-OSR, due to Michael Esfeld, which 
incorporates Causal (hypo)Structuralism and leads the way in bringing into 
attention properties qua universals. According to M-OSR, physical structures 
consist in concrete relations among objects whose identity is given by the 
relations they engage into, CS’ contribution denying quiddities to properties – 
that is, properties ought to be identified only via their causal profile. One of the 
problems of CS is that it replaces quiddity with totalitas: 
All it will succeed in identifying is the whole network of properties [that satisfy 
the Ramsified lawbook], without identifying any of them in particular. Here, at 
best, we get a totalitas (the Ramsified lawbook) and a specification of 
properties in relation to it. [...] this relative specification will leave us in the 
dark as to what property is what. (Psillos 2012, 175) 
The solution to this puzzle is that some of the properties get their 
identification by some other process, and this leads straight to causal 
hypostructuralism, where causality itself has to be identified via something 
independent of its function in the web. However the path of causal 
(hypo)structuralism might seem misleading, CS seems to promise to ground the 
idea that physical structures are “genuinely causal, their essence being their 
power to produce certain effects.” (Psillos 2012, 176) Psillos advocates for a 
version of structural universals admitting spatial universals able to account for 
both features that structures seem to require for OSR: abstraction, as they are 
repeatable and shareable, and modality – bearing the force to produce effects in 
the phenomenal world (Psillos 2012, 184).  
OSR possesses the feature of a very promising account for our scientific 
theories – it is able to sustain the no-miracles argument and to defend realism 
against pessimistic meta-induction; it also has metaphysical implications. 
However, the last dimension remains to be explored – as we have seen, this view 
has to explain how structures, though abstract, can have modal, physical effects. 
In what follows, I offer another interpretation for this matter, one in which the 
starting point is the object, not the structure. I describe another way of reaching 
structures, via objects, and discuss some of the contributions this account can 
bring to (O)SR. 
Theories of Ground 
The theory of ground I will refer to is the one advocated by Kit Fine, according to 
which the notion of ground is the metaphysical counterpart of ‘essence.’ One 
important aspect in the family of ground is related to ontological dependence, 
one of the virtues acquired by adopting Fine’s view on essence.  
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Ancestors of Ground: A Finean Account on Essence 
Traditionally, the pair necessity-essence was given the form of reduction of the 
latter to the former. This relation is expressed, in (philosophical) logic, by using 
de re statements and the necessity operator, such that in assessing the sentence’s 
truth value, one should be committed to the necessary attribution of a given 
property in all the possible worlds the object we are referring to exists. 
According to this view, an essential property is a property the object has in all 
the possible worlds – in other words, there is no way we can conceive of the 
object not having that very property. Conditions have been imposed on the type 
of property discussed here – it should not be a trivial one (such as self-identity or 
existence), it should not be possessed in virtue of some other property, 
belonging to another category (for instance, Socrates’ humanity is not essential 
in virtue of the identity between 2 and 2) and so on.  
However, difficulties arise from this account. The most prominent criticist 
of de re statements is Quine, who dismisses the analogy in treatment of modal 
and temporal logic, arguing that although they seem similar, preservation of 
identity across possible worlds or by continuity in time, in the same world, are 
different matters (Quine 1976). In fact, only the latter is plausible, – for the 
transworld identity, we have no warrants, as the objects’ quiddities, should they 
exist, are not accessible to us. Admitting de re statements is committing oneself 
to the “jungle of Aristotelian essentialism” (Quine 1953), and it should be 
avoided, even if the price is to give up this kind of statements.5 
Another challenge was raised by Roderick Chisholm (1967): suppose we 
have a set of possible worlds W and the actual world is ‘w*.’ Some of our objects 
are Adam and Noah. We can exchange their properties, one by one, slightly, such 
that in consecutive worlds, no differences can be observed. In the final world, 
let’s call it ‘u,’ the role played by Adam will belong to a person presenting all of 
Noah’s [w*] properties and vice versa. It is also important to note that 
adjustments are to be made also to the other objects whose properties are 
related to Adam and Noah. The puzzle then arises: by transitivity of identity, 
Adam [w*] and Adam [u] are identical. Still, the properties of Adam [w*] 
correspond to those of Noah [u] and, and Adam [u] has all and only the 
properties of Noah [w*]. This example shows us that we do not have a means by 
which to determine the objects’ quiddities. Also, there seems to be a problem 
with de re statements, which actually imply we can talk about essential 
properties, in terms of necessity. 
However, Kit Fine objects, in a series of articles, to this traditional account 
on essence and suggests that instead we should treat necessity in terms of 
essence6. Should we have a property F, and a statement A, then FA, read “A is 
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concern about its legitimacy. 
6 For more details, see Fine 1994. 
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true in virtue of the nature of the objects which F.”7 The statement is obtained by 
prefixing A with the essentialist operator F, ‘in virtue of the objects that F,’ 
which has been formed by specifying the property F to the essentialist operator. 
The logic thus developed, E5(+) incorporates S5, the standard modal logic system 
and some other axioms that describe its characteristics. In what follows, its 
metaphysical implications will be taken into account. The statement A, in the 
above example, attributes essential properties to an object; its truth-value is 
determined in relation with a class of objects sharing a certain property – F. How 
was this class obtained? Fine’s answer would be: by using the -abstraction on 
the property F – thus creating a cloud containing all the objects that F. The 
nature of the objects that F is in question here, and this very nature establishes 
the truth of statement A.  
Reformulating the issues raised by CP can bring us one step closer to the 
issues that the finean account on essence aims to solve. CP questions our 
common intuitions on the relation between objects and properties – who is 
identical to whom, in the above-mentioned example? Is Adam [w*] identical with 
Adam [u] in virtue of the role they play in the ‘structure’ of the respective 
possible worlds, or the former is identical to Noah [u] because of the properties 
they share? Is it essential for one object to stand in the relations it stands, or its 
properties are the ones that help us identify it? The core of this problem seems 
to be the notion of ontological dependence between objects and properties: 
objects are given to us fully loaded with their properties and the relations they 
stand in – objects are ontologically dependent of the properties they have, and 
the properties are also dependent on the objects instantiating them. The finean 
notion of essence promises to be free of ontological dependence: a property F is 
abstracted from an object and the class of all objects that have this property is 
then obtained. Then, in virtue of the nature of that cloud of objects, statements 
receive their evaluation. The dependence chain is broken once through -
abstraction and then by the instantiation of the property in some object, about 
which the statement is about.  
Grounds in Metaphysics 
Ground, if you like, stands to philosophy as cause stands to science. (Fine 2012) 
A similar relation to that between essence and necessity is the one between 
grounds and explanation. Ground is considered to be the ultimate, fundamental 
form of explanation; it belongs to the metaphysical level and it links entities of 
the same kind: facts or statements. It borrows a traditional form and consists of 
grounding and grounded entities, and presents many varieties, according to the 
criteria taken into consideration. Thus, it can be (non)/factive, plural or singular, 
full or partial, (im)/mediate, weak or strict, (non)/distributive.  
                                                        
7 See Fine 1995, 241-242. 
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For example, we can talk about a fact C grounded in the fact A and some 
other ground B, which is not factive8. Let us consider B to be a moral judgment; 
then, C is non-factively (because of B), plurally (because of A and B grounding 
together C) grounded. On the other side, A and B are each partial (non-
distributive) grounds for C.  
The image I try to picture about grounds goes as follows: they belong, in a 
theoretical account, to the species of explanation. In the world, they are facts that 
produce effects. They cannot replicate (they are non-reflexive), but support 
transitivity (because of the mediate type allowed) and are not symmetrical 
(because of non-reflexivity and in order to avoid circularity – a grounded fact 
cannot ground its ground(s)). They can be encountered at all levels of the 
physical world, up to the fundamental one, where we should or could be talking 
about the ungrounded. A grounding fact can thus have its own grounds, as long 
as it is not circular; also, there is a limit where the chain ends.9 
Grounds also prove to be a strong and useful resource for realism – they 
are is, as Fine advocates, the starting point for a discussion about what is real: 
I come to two main conclusions: first, that there is a primitive metaphysical 
concept of reality, one that cannot be understood in fundamentally different 
terms; and second, that questions of what is real are to be settled upon the 
basis of considerations of ground. (Fine 2001, 1) 
Fine argues that determining which propositions are factual requires an 
inquiry on the grounds of the entities in question, as real/fundamental 
propositions are factual, and propositions grounded in the real are factual (Fine 
2001, 28). The approach he favors consists in a continuous search of grounds for 
propositions, until we reach to what is (grounded in the) real, as “any basic 
factual proposition will be real. For any true factual proposition is real or 
grounded in what is real; and so the proposition, if basic, will be real.” (Fine 1002, 
26). If such a point is reached, then another real/existing fact/entity has been 
determined. Realism, then, starts gaining force. 
This is one of the applications of the theories of ground. Another step, 
closer to the philosophy of science, has been made by Shamik Dasgupta. His 
works on grounds and structural realism seem to support my intuition that the 
former can play an important role in providing the metaphysical framework that 
philosophers of science require from structuralism. According to Dasgupta 
(2014), the logical structure of grounds allows for structuralist hypotheses and 
ground is irreducibly plural. The plurality, symbolized by , is a list, not a 
conjunction of grounds, and this is also the form of the grounded, let us say . 
Grounds metaphysically necessitate the grounded and each member of  has to 
be relevant with respect to , they can be transitive (derivative ground), certain 
                                                        
8 That is, itself a fact. 
9 For a detailed presentation of the types of ground and the interaction between the members 
of this relation, see Fine 2012. 
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conditions being met. The qualitativist view of the world Dasgupta adheres to is 
an explanatory relation; hence the challenge of showing that the explanantia are 
sufficient for the explanans, to whom he argues that it can be met if one adopts 
plural grounds. Structuralism is a version of qualitativism and the plural 
requirement that accompanies it leads us to the idea that, since the world is 
made of purely qualitative facts, then the individualistic ones are to be explained 
only following the plural grounds schema – that is, when they are explained 
simultaneously (Dasgupta 2014).10  
For example, let us consider a unity of measurement – Dasgupta’s choice is 
for quantity. The manner in which the reference unit is established is more or 
less arbitrary, but subsequently, quantities are to be determined by reference to 
this unit. The relations established among objects possessing the property of 
having mass are structural – they cannot account for how bodies in the actual 
world can be related to others in some other possible world (given the 
arbitrariness of the reference unit choice). Our most plausible account on the 
given, real world is then a qualitativist, structural, comparativist and plurally 
grounded one.  
Grounds and Structures. Possible Metaphysical Frameworks 
In philosophy of science, structural realism has two main branches: the 
epistemological one, which gives an account on how and why we get our 
scientific theories, and the metaphysical one, which is supposed to shed light on 
the ‘furniture of the world.’ One of the most viable candidates to the latter proves 
to be OSR, which nonetheless encounters difficulties, one of them being that is 
has to be abstract enough as to enable talking about structures, but also concrete 
enough to explain instantiation by the physical systems. 
My proposal is to take into consideration the grounding theories. As we 
have seen, steps towards giving an account of structuralism and realism in terms 
of grounds have been made (Fine 2001), (Dasgupta 2013 and 2014). However, 
the possibility that they could positively contribute to OSR’s difficulties seems 
unexplored, and my suggestion is to draw attention to that direction. Should we 
take into consideration a finean ancestry of the notion, we could consider these 
relations as being able to account for both of Psillos’ requirements. If necessity 
and essence stand in the same type of relation as the pair causation-ground, we 
can then discuss about causation as expressible/reducible to a certain type of 
ground. 
Is the theory of ground, as presented above, compatible with OSR? I am 
inclined to answer affirmatively – in my view, the Weltanschauung grounds offer 
has modal powers, because they allow discussion about necessity, possibility and 
face similar difficulties with OSR. What would then be the benefits of adopting it? 
                                                        
10 It could be interesting to compare this result to the totalitas objection formulated by Psillos 
(see above). 
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The strongest point I can find is that it can be an answer to the challenge of 
explaining how a structure that is abstract in nature can have concrete, physical 
influences. Should we follow Fine’s advice, then grounds and causation stand in 
the same relation as essence and necessity – the second can be, and is expressed 
by means of the former. Moreover, grounds are the fundamental form of 
explanation, located at the metaphysical level. Causation, instead, belongs to the 
reign of phenomena; we are thus able to offer a metaphysical explanation of a 
concrete, more or less observable relation. 
Conclusions  
In the light of this argumentation, then, we can conceive of the theory of ground 
as being a meta-metaphysical11 theory with respect to structural realism or, 
particularly, OSR, with which I have not identified, for the moment, any 
incompatibility. Grounding should not be, in my view, a replacement for OSR; 
instead, since OSR concerns a part of the world, namely our scientific theories of 
fundamental research, and the grounding theory could be thought of as 
accounting for the world as a totality, perhaps the natural move is to consider 
OSR to be under ground’s range, explaining thus why I advance it as a meta-
metaphysical theory (with respect to OSR which already has been included in the 
kingdom of metaphysics). 
However, it would be interesting to compare the issues both theories 
encounter with respect to individuation and identity. And also, to my mind, the 
relation between abstract and modal/concrete could be subject to further 
investigation. 
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